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“[T]he Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply 
because the court believes that questioning one witness about an-
other’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Imagine that you are selected as a juror in a trial where the 
defendant is accused of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
You listen to the police officer who testifies that he observed the 
?  J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Political 
Science, 2001, University of South Florida. I wish to thank Professor Charles W. Ehrhardt 
for his helpful guidance on the Court’s development of the Confrontation Clause and its 
implications in the courtroom and Professor Nat S. Stern for his input on earlier drafts and 
encouragement of my scholarship. Finally, thank you to my husband, Trey Price, for his 
love, encouragement, and constant support. 
 1.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico (Bullcoming III), 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011). 
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defendant and believed him to be intoxicated. You hear about how, 
after obtaining a warrant, the officer took the defendant to the emer-
gency room for a blood-alcohol test. The police officer finishes his 
testimony, and the next witness will testify about the results of the 
defendant’s blood-alcohol test. 
 But before the witness can testify, defense counsel objects. Appar-
ently, this is not the laboratory analyst who conducted the test. In 
fact, this expert witness did not observe the testing process, write the 
lab report soon to be admitted into evidence, or certify that the testing 
results were accurate. The actual analyst who performed the test will 
not appear as a witness because he is on unpaid administrative 
leave. And no, you may not know why. 
 The judge overrules the objection and the uninvolved expert wit-
ness testifies about the lab’s procedures and answers questions about 
what the lab report states—that the defendant had a blood-alcohol 
level above the legal limit. On the stand, however, the uninvolved 
expert witness admits that he cannot verify that that lab’s proce-
dures were actually followed. Would you convict? 
 In reality, this hypothetical scenario is not as hypothetical as it 
may seem.2 Numerous juries have convicted defendants based on se-
cond-hand (or hearsay) expert witness testimony about laboratory 
reports performed and certified by other analysts who never appeared 
at trial.3
 On June 23, 2011, however, the Supreme Court put this practice 
to a stop in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.4 Or did it? In perhaps the 
closest majority in recent Confrontation Clause history, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that the protections of the Sixth Amendment extend 
to the admission of scientific evidence against a defendant, so long as 
the evidence consists of a written report admitted at trial. Thus, in 
the case of the hypothetical, the defendant would have the right to 
cross-examine an analyst involved in the testing process, though not 
necessarily the actual analyst who performed the test. Despite the 
sound foundations of the majority’s reasoning, however, the Court 
failed to create a clear rule in Bullcoming,5 giving states multiple 
 2.  See State v. Bullcoming (Bullcoming I), 189 P.3d 679, 681-82, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
 3.  See infra Part IV.B-D; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). 
 4.  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 5.  Arguably, the Court has taken nothing but a cautious series of “baby steps” 
through its modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004), Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 
S. Ct. 2527 (2009), Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011), and now Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at ix-x (1999) 
(recommending that courts “avoid[] clear rules and final resolutions” to be “[a]lert to the 
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loopholes to use to avoid implicating Confrontation Clause require-
ments. The Court may move to close one of these four loopholes rela-
tively quickly: the Court granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois6
five days after deciding Bullcoming, ensuring we have not heard the 
Court’s “last word” on the Confrontation Clause as it applies to the 
admission of scientific evidence against defendants. 
 This Note examines the modern history of the Confrontation 
Clause, beginning with the Court’s decision to overturn more than 
two decades of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. 
Washington7 and continuing with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts’8
requirements for the admission of testimonial scientific evidence. 
Second, this Note examines the Court’s recent decision in Bullcom-
ing, particularly Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. This Note argues 
that Justice Sotomayor’s four limitations on Bullcoming’s holding 
provide lower courts with a series of loopholes they may continue to 
use to avoid Confrontation Clause requirements, at least until the 
Court directly addresses each of the loopholes. Finally, this Note 
urges the Court to close one of Justice Sotomayor’s Bullcoming loop-
holes by reversing the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. 
Williams.9 The Supreme Court should not tolerate prosecutors’ at-
tempts to avoid Confrontation Clause requirements by introducing 
otherwise testimonial evidence through surrogate witnesses under 
the guise of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.  
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A.   The Sixth Amendment and the Roberts Reliability Test 
 The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution places a constitu-
tional burden on the government, in addition to any applicable feder-
al or state evidentiary rules, for admitting evidence against a de-
fendant at trial. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment states that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”10 But how should the 
Court define “witnesses against” or “to be confronted”? Are neutral 
scientists “witnesses against” a defendant? Should expert witnesses 
                                                                                                                  
problem of unanticipated consequences” and “promote the democratic ideals of 
participation, deliberation, and responsiveness”). 
 6.  131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). 
 7.  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 8.  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 9.  People v. Williams (Williams II), 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).  
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In addition to applying to federal criminal trials, the 
Confrontation Clause applies to state criminal proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
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be able to testify to their own independent opinions when those opinions 
are based on inadmissible testimonial evidence?  
 As the Court noted in 2004, “[t]he Constitution’s text does not 
alone resolve” the matter.11 Courts are frequently in disagreement 
about exactly how the Confrontation Clause intersects with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, particularly hearsay rules.12 Even the Su-
preme Court has reversed its own analysis when navigating complex 
cases involving the intersection of the Confrontation Clause and 
hearsay rules.13
 Under the Court’s earlier holding in Ohio v. Roberts,14 the Con-
frontation Clause was an empty safeguard for defendants, seemingly 
granting strong protection, but in reality providing prosecutors with 
numerous exceptions to evade its enforcement.15 Permitting these 
exceptions was a practicality for the Court, because if the Constitu-
tion were read literally, the Confrontation Clause “would abrogate 
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended 
and too extreme.”16 As such, out-of-court statements were permitted 
at trial, so long as the prosecution could show that the witness was 
unavailable17 and that the evidence bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliabil-
ity.’ ”18 The Court held that reliability could be shown by meeting a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception,”19 despite noting the hearsay rule 
had been “riddled with exceptions developed over three centuries” 
ago and resembled “an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches 
cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists.”20
Even if the evidence did not meet one of the several hearsay excep-
tions within the Federal Rules of Evidence,21 it could properly be 
 11.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
 12.  See infra Parts IV.D, V.B. 
 13.  Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (stating that “certain hearsay 
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within 
them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection’ ”) (quoting Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)), with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (overturning 
Roberts and stating that “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of 
evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most 
flagrant inquisitorial practices”). 
 14.  448 U.S. 56. 
 15.  The Crawford Court held that its earlier reasoning in Roberts was “so 
unpredictable that it fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 16.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 
 17.  To show unavailability, the state must have made a good-faith effort to obtain the 
witness’s presence at trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
 18.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 19.  Id.
 20.  Id. at 62 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking 
Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937)). 
 21.  See FED. R. EVID. 803-04.  
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admitted against the defendant at trial so long as it presented a 
“particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness.”22
B.   Crawford v. Washington: The Beginning of the Modern            
Confrontation Clause 
Led by Justice Scalia, a seven-member majority23 on the Court 
took a dramatic turn in Confrontation Clause history in Crawford v. 
Washington.24 Overturning the Roberts decision and its reasoning, the 
Court examined the Confrontation Clause’s history25 and determined 
that “[a]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is funda-
mentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”26 Reflecting on the 
previous twenty-four years, the Court noted that “[t]he legacy of Roberts
in other courts vindicates the Framers’ wisdom in rejecting a general 
reliability exception.”27 What the Confrontation Clause guaranteed, 
the Court held, was not that evidence could be admitted after being 
deemed reliable, “but that reliability [must] be assessed in a particu-
lar manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”28
 “[W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless,” as the Framers recog-
nized, and “very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”29 A 
trial judge or jury cannot possibly determine, based on written evidence 
alone, whether test results were fabricated, poorly performed, or 
otherwise the product of fraud. Unlike reliance on a written state-
ment, cross-examination provides the defendant with her constitutional 
right to test the witness’s perception, credibility, and partiality.30
 The Crawford Court, however, did not hold that all evidence ad-
mitted against the accused was subject to a Confrontation Clause 
analysis.31 The majority was mainly concerned with evidence it con-
 22.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 23.  Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer formed 
Crawford’s majority opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor filed a 
concurring opinion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36-76 (2004). 
 24.  Id.
 25.  For the Court’s historical background on the Confrontation Clause, see id. at 42-50.  
 26.  Id. at 61. “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable,” 
the Court held, “is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously 
guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” Id. at 62. The Crawford
Court was concerned that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.” 
Id. at 63. 
 27.  Id. For example, Roberts would have allowed trial courts to determine that the 
need for “effective law enforcement” outweighed a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64. 
 28.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.” Id.  
 29.  Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer 
(Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 469, 473 (1971)). 
 30.  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 31.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating the Confrontation Clause “reflects an especially 
acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement”). 
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sidered “testimonial.”32 Once a witness’s evidence is considered 
testimonial, it may not be admitted without showing the witness’s 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.33 Even 
when a witness was clearly absent from the jurisdiction, the Court 
has held that the government had not shown unavailability until it 
sought in good faith the witness’s presence.34
 With Crawford, Justice Scalia’s seven-member majority attempted 
to make clear that a defendant’s right to cross-examination is so 
fundamental that alternative methods of showing a statement’s reli-
ability would not suffice.35 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor concurred with the majority’s ultimate holding, but disa-
greed with the Court’s overruling of Roberts.36 Specifically, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist took aim at the majority’s decision to bifurcate tes-
timonial and nontestimonial evidence for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause. Rehnquist argued that the Crawford decision was “not 
backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning” and that it “cast[] a 
mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials.”37
 And “cast[] a mantle of uncertainty” Crawford did. Courts strug-
gled with determining whether a variety of different types of evidence 
were testimonial.38 Two years after Crawford, in Davis v. Washing-
ton,39 the Court made the definition of “testimonial” a bit murkier. 
Despite Crawford’s suggestion that police interrogations were likely 
testimonial,40 in Davis, the Court held that they might not be testi-
monial after all if they were conducted to meet an ongoing emergency.41
But were the results of scientific tests testimonial? In subsequent 
years, courts across the country were holding that many types of 
 32.  Testimonial statements included “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent,” including “material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” and police officer 
interrogations. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 
02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940). 
 33.  Id. at 59. Even where the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination, the Court “excluded the testimony where the government had not established 
unavailability of the witness.” Id. at 57. 
 34.  Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that the government had not 
shown unavailability, even though the witness was in a federal prison in another state). 
The Barber Court also noted that securing out-of-state witnesses was not difficult because 
participating states could use the “Uniform Act [t]o Secure the Attendance of Witnesses 
from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings” to compel private citizens to appear in 
Court to testify. Id. at 723 n.4; see also 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 10:12 n.78 (15th ed. 2010) (providing the specific 
statutes for all 50 states that have adopted some version of the Uniform Act). 
 35.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62. 
 36.  Id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 37. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 38.  See, e.g., discussion infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.  
 39.  547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 40.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.   
 41.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
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scientific evidence, such as lab reports and certifications of substances’ 
chemical compositions, were not testimonial because they were 
“ ‘regularly conducted business activit[ies],’ ” thus eligible for admis-
sion as a hearsay exception.42 Other courts considered scientific evi-
dence nontestimonial because it was raw data and not the product of 
expert opinion.43
C.   Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: The Court Applies the          
Confrontation Clause to Scientific Evidence in Criminal Trials 
 It was not until 2009 that the Supreme Court first determined 
whether sworn scientific certificates were testimonial.44 Still led by 
Justice Scalia, only five justices joined the majority opinion,45 but 
several aspects of the decision left significant doubt as to the limitations 
on the Court’s opinion. 
 In Melendez-Diaz, the majority held that a defendant’s right to 
confront adverse witnesses extended beyond those who observed an 
alleged crime and included laboratory scientists who analyzed 
criminal evidence in preparation for trial.46 The Court found that cer-
tified laboratory certificates, which were notarized and provided the 
composition, quality, and net weight of a substance, were within 
the “core class of testimonial statements” because they were “quite 
plainly affidavits.”47
 However, despite Melendez-Diaz “involv[ing] little more than the 
application of [the Court’s] holding in Crawford,”48 Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence removed all doubt about the reach of the majority opin-
ion. Justice Thomas stated that he joined the majority only because 
the laboratory certificates were “formalized testimonial materials.”49
As such, courts speculated on the reach of the Court’s decision if the 
certificates admitted into evidence were unsworn.50
 42.  See, e.g., Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679, 684-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. 
Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 639 (N.M. 2004), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011)).  
 43.  See, e.g., cases cited infra note 135. 
 44.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  
 45.  Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed the five-member 
majority in Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 2530-42. However, Justice Thomas additionally wrote a 
separate concurring opinion emphasizing the narrowness of his agreement. Id. at 2543 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Kennedy and Breyer, formerly in the Crawford
majority, joined Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in dissent. Id. at 2543-61 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 46.  Id. at 2532. 
 47.  Id. Affidavits were specifically mentioned within the definition of testimonial 
articulated in Crawford. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 48.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. 
 49.  Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing his prior concurrences in White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008), and Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)).  
 50.  See infra note 160.  
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 Justice Thomas did not object, however, to the majority’s holding 
in regards to the categorization of laboratory scientists as adverse 
witnesses. Despite the State of Massachusetts’ argument that scientists 
were not “accusatory witnesses” because they were only testifying 
about scientific facts (as opposed to the defendant’s guilt), the majori-
ty quickly dispelled the notion that any witness in a criminal trial 
could be neutral.51 Because the scientific evidence was testimonial 
and the analyst certifying its authenticity was accusatory, the state 
was required under the U.S. Constitution to present the analyst for 
confrontation at trial.52
 The Melendez-Diaz majority reaffirmed that the Confrontation 
Clause is a procedural guarantee, once again stating that reliability 
is assessed through cross-examination, not the eyes of a trial judge.53
Further, the majority insisted cross-examining analysts was essen-
tial because “neutral scientific testing” was not as “neutral or as reli-
able” as the state suggested.54
D.   The Human Element Creates Unreliability in Science 
 Scientific tests are neither inherently neutral nor reliable: the 
tests themselves can rely upon bad or outdated science, and the sci-
entists performing the tests have been found to falsify, manipulate, 
or improperly perform them.55 For example, in 2004, the National 
Academy of Sciences found that due to variations in the manufacturing 
of bullets, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) decades-long 
practice of relying on “comparative bullet-lead analysis” in criminal 
trials was “unreliable and potentially misleading.”56 Despite 
“[h]undreds of defendants sitting in prisons nationwide” convicted 
with the help of FBI testimony that was “overstated” and “misleading 
under [the] [F]ederal [R]ules of [E]vidence,” the FBI “never [went] 
back to determine how many times its scientists misled jurors.”57
Years later, the National Academy released a report criticizing nu-
merous forensic laboratory practices across the country involving the 
 51.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (stating that the analysts “certainly provided 
testimony against petitioner”). “The text of the [Sixth] Amendment contemplates two 
classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor. . . . Contrary to 
respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the 
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id. at 2534. 
 52.  Id. at 2533-34. 
 53.  Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)). 
 54.  Id.
 55.  Id. at 2536-37. 
 56.  John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1. 
 57.  Id. (stating that the FBI first had concerns about the science as early as 1991 and 
that the concerns were only publicly revealed after a former FBI laboratory scientist 
decided to challenge the practice). 
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scientific analyses of “fingerprinting, firearms identification[,] . . . 
bite marks, blood spatter, hair and handwriting.”58
 Scientists may also make errors in judgment or produce fraudu-
lent test results. Analysts working at law enforcement’s request often 
“face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of 
expediency.”59 Law enforcement may also give analysts incentives to 
alter evidence to help the prosecution.60 Analysts have even been 
found to engage in deliberate, systematic fraud.61
 Even if the analyst performed the test to the best of her abilities, 
the scientific testing of evidence is not inherently reliable.62 Scientific 
tests, including the frequently used gas spectrometer/mass chroma-
tographer (GC/MS) and polymerase chain reaction DNA tests, require 
the analyst to use independent judgment and skill.63 The GC/MS “is 
like working a jigsaw puzzle,” and an analyst performing the test 
“may commit a number of errors that will render the ultimate opin-
ion unsound.”64 In fact, analysts can make four “critical errors” in in-
terpreting GC/MS results.65 An analyst making even one of these er-
rors in judgment could alter the identification of the sample.66
 58.  Solomon Moore, Science Found Wanting in Nation’s Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2009, at A1 (stating that “such analyses are often handled by poorly trained technicians 
who then exaggerate the accuracy of their methods in court”); see generally Nat’l Research 
Council of the Nat’l Acads., Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html. 
 59.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l 
Acads., supra note 58, at 24). 
 60.  See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 497 
& n.99, 498 (2006) (citing a Federal Bureau of Investigation study that found 
prosecutors sometimes pressure analysts to “push the envelope” and that the analysts, 
in turn, respond). 
 61.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (discussing several documented cases of 
error, fraud, and instances where forensic scientists engaged in “drylabbing” by reporting 
the results of tests never performed); Metzger, supra note 60, at 499 (detailing a West 
Virginia forensic serologist who disregarded procedures, altered records, and deliberately 
misreported test results from 1979 until 1989). 
 62.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (stating “[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out 
not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well”). 
 63.  Id.
 64.  2 P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23-3(C), at 402-403 
(3d ed. 1999). 
 65.  Id. (including (1) improper preparation of the sample where the GC fails to 
separate the sample before the MS analysis occurs; (2) miscounting mass unit numbers 
along the spectrum; (3) disregarding one peak along the spectrum, which could change the 
drug’s identification if the analyst chose to include it; and (4) failing to distinguish between 
the true parent peak and a false isotopic peak). The Supreme Court recognized the 
potential for these four errors in Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 66.  See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 64; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2537-38 (recognizing that even though GC/MS machines can be “equipped with comput-
erized matching systems, ‘forensic analysts in crime laboratories typically do not utilize 
this feature of the instrument, but rely exclusively on their subjective judgment.’ ” (quoting 
James M. Shellow, The Application of Daubert to the Identification of Drugs, 2 SHEPARD’S
EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 593, 600 (1995))). 
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 Further, performing DNA tests and analyzing the results requires 
more independent analysis than the GC/MS test, presenting even 
more opportunity for errors in judgment.67 With such a high potential 
for error, defendants must have “a reasonable opportunity to deter-
mine through cross-examination if any such error or falsification is 
present in any DNA testing admitted into evidence.”68
 Jurors give scientific test results significant credibility in a crimi-
nal trial.69 Confronting scientists in the courtroom gives defendants 
the opportunities to uncover errors in judgment or faulty procedures 
in a way they never could without cross-examination.70 Even if cross-
examination proved ineffective in an individual case, the Court found 
the “prospect of confrontation” was important because it would help 
“deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.”71
 In a sign of restraint, however, and possibly to help keep hold on 
its majority, the Melendez-Diaz Court specifically held that it was not 
requiring in-court testimony from everyone who knew something 
about the evidence’s authenticity or the accuracy of the testing devices.72
In the infamous footnote 1, the Court held that any gaps in the chain 
of custody would go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibil-
 67.  Williams II, 939 N.E. 2d 268, 279 (Ill. 2010) (citing P. GIANNELLI & E.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.04(b), at 57 (4th ed. 2007) (stating “when 
technical problems materialize, it can be very difficult to interpret the electropherograms 
. . . . Thus, there is room for subjective judgment”)), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 
2011) (No. 10-8505). For a brief explanation of polymerase chain reaction testing (a 
common form of DNA testing), see id. at 271.  
 68.  United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that 
denying the defendant the opportunity to question an analyst on his results and 
conclusions is a violation of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights).  
 69.  Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., supra note 58, at 48-49 (stating that 
academics are concerned with whether “the conclusiveness and finality of the manner in 
which forensic evidence is presented on television results in jurors giving more or less 
credence to the forensic experts and their testimony than they should, raising expectations, 
and possibly resulting in a miscarriage of justice”). For additional research analyzing the 
possibility of the CSI Effect, see Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between Substance and 
Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 161, 163 n.11, 179 n.93 (2010) (citing multiple studies); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI 
and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE
L.J. 1050, 1053 (2006) (noting that after Robert Blake’s acquittal, “jurors complained about 
the lack of fingerprints, DNA, and gunshot residue—evidence not often available in 
criminal trials but frequently used on television”); Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, 
Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN.
L. Rev. 1335, 1343 (2009) (analyzing CSI as a “cultural phenomenon” and possibly a “self-
denying prophecy” promoted by prosecutors); and Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & 
Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: 
Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 332-33 (2006) (concluding, 
after a survey of 1,027 jurors who served in a Michigan state court during the summer of 
2006, that the CSI effect was “mixed” but a “broader tech effect” may be causing increased 
juror demand for scientific evidence). 
 70.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37.  
 71.  Id. at 2537. 
 72.  Id. at 2532 n.1. 
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ity, and that so long as the prosecution introduced the testimony live 
(through a qualified witness), the evidence was admissible.73
 Footnote 1 also legitimately gave prosecutors some wiggle room 
when it came to which witnesses they would present at trial for cross-
examination.74 This wiggle room “confound[ed] the lower courts,” 
allowing the states to read Melendez-Diaz narrowly and continue to 
evade the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause through a number of measures.75 Fifteen months after the 
Melendez-Diaz decision, by granting one defendant’s petition for 
writ of certiorari, the Court waded back into determining what the 
Confrontation Clause requires for the admission of scientific evi-
dence, if anything.76
III.   BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO: THE COURT NARROWLY AFFIRMS 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE’S PROMISE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
 The Bullcoming77 opinion represents the Court’s closest-held Con-
frontation Clause majority in recent history. Written by Justice 
Ginsburg, the majority opinion held that when a forensic laboratory 
report containing testimonial statements is entered into evidence, the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant the right to confront 
the scientist who certified the testimonial information.78 And yet, 
in a case where the facts were “materially indistinguishable” from 
Melendez-Diaz,79 an analysis of the Court’s majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions80 shows this seemingly straightforward 
application of Confrontation Clause law was anything but clear-cut for 
the Justices.  
 73.  Id.
 74.  Id. (stating “it is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody 
are so crucial as to require” live testimony). 
 75.  Joëlle Anne Moreno, C.S.I. BullS#!t: The National Academy of Sciences, Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, and Future Challenges to Forensic Science and Forensic Experts,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 327, 331 (2010) (calling the post-Melendez-Diaz cases “so disparate and 
bizarre” and providing as many as seven different factors used by the lower courts in 
making their ultimate decisions). 
 76.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (granting certiorari).  
 77.  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 78.  Id. at 2710. 
 79.  Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 80.  Justice Ginsburg wrote a fractured majority opinion, with Justice Scalia joining in 
full, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan objecting to Part IV, and Justice Thomas objecting to 
Part IV and footnote 6. Id. at 2705-19. Justice Sotomayor also wrote a concurring opinion. 
Id. at 2719-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito, as they did in the Court’s Melendez-Diaz decision, dissented. Id. at 2723-
28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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A.   Bullcoming: The Facts81
 Donald Bullcoming rear-ended Dennis Jackson’s pick-up truck 
while it was stopped at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexi-
co.82 Jackson’s wife called the police after Jackson noticed that Bull-
coming’s eyes were bloodshot and smelled alcohol on Bullcoming’s 
breath.83 Bullcoming left the scene of the accident, but an officer sub-
sequently found him and watched him fail a series of field sobriety 
tests.84 The police obtained a warrant to perform a blood-alcohol 
analysis because Bullcoming refused to take a breath test.85
 Using a gas chromatograph machine,86 Caylor, an analyst with the 
New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division, 
tested Bullcoming’s blood.87 It was not until the day of the trial, how-
ever, that the prosecution informed the court it would not be calling 
Caylor as a witness, stating only that he had been put on unpaid leave 
very recently; the prosecution did not disclose the reason.88 Instead, 
the State presented another analyst from the laboratory, Razatos, 
who “was familiar with the laboratory’s testing procedures, but had 
neither participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming’s blood 
sample.”89 Defense counsel objected, but the trial court admitted the 
blood analysis report into evidence under the hearsay exception for 
business records.90 The trial court also allowed Razatos to testify.91
 81.  The facts of Bullcoming provide the reader with background perspective on the 
issues underlying the legal discussions within the case. The author does not suggest that 
Donald Bullcoming may be innocent of the charges against him. His reprehensible conduct 
does, however, illustrate that the government’s burden is the same high standard, 
regardless of whether the defendant appears to be guilty or innocent. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously 
guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”).  
 In some instances, following Confrontation Clause procedure can make all the 
difference. See Martin Finucane, Drug Defendant Retried on High Court’s Order is 
Acquited, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2011, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
massachusetts/articles/2011/02/11/drug_defendant_retried_on_high_courts_order_is_acquit
ted/ (stating that after the Supreme Court’s verdict, Melendez-Diaz was found not guilty in 
his jury retrial). 
 82.  State v. Bullcoming (Bullcoming II), 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 4-5. 
 85.  Id. at 5. 
 86.  Id. at 4. 
 87.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
 88.  Id. at 2711-12. The prosecution did not assert that Caylor was “unavailable” for 
trial; rather, “[t]he record showed only that [he] was placed on unpaid leave for an 
undisclosed reason.” Id. at 2714. 
 89.  Id. at 2709; see also Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 6. 
 90.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 91.  Id. at 2712 n.3 (noting that the trial judge stated that when he started practicing 
law “there were no breath tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop 
said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’ ”). 
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 At trial, the State of New Mexico admitted the results of Bullcom-
ing’s blood sample into evidence, showing his blood-alcohol concen-
tration was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters.92 The prosecution 
asked Razatos whether “any human being could look and write and 
just record the result” from the gas chromatograph, and he answered 
in the affirmative.93 While the blood sample report indicated that 
Caylor had followed the laboratory’s procedures,94 Razatos also ad-
mitted that “you don’t know unless you actually observe the analysis 
that someone else conducts, whether they followed th[e] protocol in 
every instance.”95 The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI 
(Driving While Intoxicated).96
 Bullcoming raised five issues on appeal,97 including whether the 
trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting 
the blood sample report into evidence when Caylor was not available 
to testify.98 One year before Melendez-Diaz,99 the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals held that Bullcoming’s blood alcohol report was 
admissible because it was nontestimonial “and prepared routinely 
with guarantees of trustworthiness.”100 Even though Crawford abro-
gated the prior reliability test of Ohio v. Roberts, the court of appeals 
held that it was bound by State v. Dedman101 and that the blood sam-
ple report was properly admitted because it met the requirements for 
hearsay exemption.102
 92.  Id. at 2710. 
 93.  Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 6. 
 94.  Id.
 95.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 n.8. 
 96.  Id. at 2709, 2712. 
 97.  Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679, 681 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 
2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
 98.  Id.
 99.  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  
 100.  Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d at 685 (citing State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004)). 
 101.  Id. (citing Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636 (holding that the New Mexico courts could 
still use the Roberts reliability test so long as they determined the laboratory reports were 
nontestimonial evidence, because a “close reading of Crawford indicates” that the Supreme 
Court “appears split” on whether the Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial 
evidence)). The Dedman court stated that “the [Supreme] Court did not overrule Roberts,
and it did not reply to [Chief Justice Rehnquist’s] assertion that it had done so.” Id. (citing 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (even though 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Crawford Court’s decision to overrule Roberts,
he filed a concurring opinion). But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (providing a list of the 
“core class of ‘testimonial’ statements,” including “material such as affidavits” and 
“formalized testimonial materials”). 
 102.  Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d at 684-85 (stating that “ ‘ordinarily a blood alcohol report 
is admissible as a public record and presents no issue under the Confrontation Clause 
because the report is non-testimonial and satisfies’ the test of Ohio v. Roberts . . . abrogated 
by Crawford . . . concerning the admission of hearsay evidence under the Confrontation 
Clause’ ” (citing Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636)). The New Mexico Court of Appeals admitted, 
“We are bound by Dedman, a decision of our Supreme Court, and we therefore do not 
address the opinions of other states on the issue[,] . . . ‘even when a United States Supreme 
Court decision seems contra.’ ” Id. at 685 (quoting State v. Manzanares, 674 P.2d 511, 512 
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  One year following the court of appeals’ decision, the Supreme 
Court held in Melendez-Diaz103 that “[t]here [was] little doubt” that 
analysts’ certificates of analysis fell “within the ‘core class of testimo-
nial statements’ ” listed in Crawford.104 The New Mexico Supreme 
Court had already granted certiorari to hear Bullcoming’s appeal105
and admitted that, post Melendez-Diaz, Dedman was no longer good 
law.106 As such, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that laboratory 
reports prepared for use at Bullcoming’s trial were testimonial and 
required a qualified witness subject to cross-examination.107
 However, like many other states that have attempted to reduce 
some of the burdens of the Confrontation Clause,108 the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that the “Defendant’s true ‘accuser’ was the gas 
chromatograph machine which detected the presence of alcohol in 
Defendant’s blood, assessed Defendant’s [blood-alcohol content], and 
generated a computer print-out listing its results.”109 Because Caylor 
“was a mere scrivener,” who had “simply transcribed the results gen-
erated by the gas chromatograph machine,” having another analyst 
testify in court was “sufficient” to fulfill Bullcoming’s Confrontation 
Clause rights.110
                                                                                                                  
(1983)). But see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (“Whether or 
not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared 
specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the 
analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 103.  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  
 104.  Id. at 2532. 
 105.  Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
 106.  Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 8. The Court also recognized that “Melendez-Diaz
throws into doubt our assessment in Dedman that blood alcohol reports as public records 
are inherently immune from governmental abuse.” Id. at 7-8. 
 107.  Id. at 8 (“Melendez-Diaz made clear that the same concerns of governmental abuse 
which exist in the production of evidence by law enforcement exist in the production of 
forensic evidence. . . . ‘[A] forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement 
official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner 
favorable to the prosecution’ ”) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536). 
 108.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 109.  Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 9 (citing United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by 
scientific instruments, though the interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”), 
United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated 
by the diagnostic machines are the ‘statements’ of the machines themselves, not their 
operators.”), and United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the computer-generated header information accompanying pornographic 
images retrieved from the Internet “was neither a ‘statement’ nor a ‘declarant’ ”)).  
 110.  Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 4, 9 (holding that Razatos was a sufficient “surrogate” 
witness, simply because he was “qualified as an expert witness with respect to the gas 
chromatograph machine”). The New Mexico Supreme Court did at least recognize that “[a] 
defendant cannot cross-examine an exhibit.” Id. at 10. 
2012]  “BULL” COMING FROM THE STATES 547 
B.   Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Bullcoming
 In a strongly-worded majority opinion, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated its commitment to enforcing the principles of the Confrontation 
Clause,111 holding that the “potential ramifications of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court’s reasoning . . . raise[d] red flags.”112 One witness’s 
testimonial statement may not be “enter[ed] into evidence through 
the in-court testimony of a second person.”113 Further, the Court held 
that Caylor’s report was obviously testimonial.114 Caylor’s presence at 
trial was essential because he was more than a “mere scrivener.”115
 Even if the blood sample report was obviously reliable, “the Clause 
does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the 
court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial 
statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-
examination.”116 Harkening back to much of its reasoning within the 
Melendez-Diaz decision, the Court detailed several significant ques-
tions that Razatos could not answer.117 Perhaps most importantly, 
Razatos could not testify as to why Caylor was placed on administra-
tive leave, and defense counsel had the right to ask whether Caylor’s 
absence was due to “incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty.”118
 111.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2716 (“Our precedent cannot sensibly be read any 
other way.”). The Court had also previously vacated and remanded a proceeding from the 
Supreme Court of Virginia for failing to follow the Melendez-Diaz precedent when it held 
that the defendant waived his Confrontation Clause rights by failing to invoke his 
Compulsory Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 
(2010); see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (stating “the Compulsory Process Clause [] is 
no substitute for the right of confrontation” and “the Confrontation Clause imposes a 
burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those 
adverse witnesses into court”). 
 112.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 113.  Id. at 2713, 2715 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Court made this point clear in Davis)); see Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (stating that “we do not think it conceivable that the 
protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking 
policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant”). 
 114.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (restating, as the Court did in Melendez-Diaz,
that “document[s] created solely for an ‘evidentiary purpose,’ . . . made in aid of a police 
investigation, rank[] as testimonial”). 
 115.  Id. at 2714. The Court stated that “Caylor certified that he received Bullcoming’s 
blood sample intact,” and that he “checked to make sure that the forensic report number 
and the sample number ‘correspond[ed].’ ” Id. (alteration in original). He also certified that 
he “adher[ed] to a precise protocol” in performing the test and that “no ‘circumstance or 
condition . . . affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the analysis.’ ” Id.
(alteration in original). “These representations, relating to past events and human actions 
not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination.” Id.
 116.  Id. at 2716 (stating also that “no substitute procedure [such as cross examining a 
substitute witness] can cure the violation”). 
 117.  Id. at 2715 (stating that Razatos could not testify about “the test and the testing 
process [Caylor] employed,” nor could he “expose any lapses or lies on [Caylor’s] part”). 
 118.  Id. Justice Scalia particularly hammered the Respondent about why Caylor was 
on unpaid leave, asking if the prosecution intentionally set up their case so that Caylor 
would not have to testify. Oral Argument at 38, id. (No. 09-10876), available at
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 Justice Ginsburg noted the dissent’s “objection [was] less to the 
application of the Court’s decisions in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz
to this case than to those pathmarking decisions themselves.”119 The 
dissent, however, labeled the majority’s opinion as a “new and serious 
misstep,” because Bullcoming was provided with a “knowledgeable 
representative of the laboratory,” which was all that is required by 
the Confrontation Clause.120 Labeling Caylor a “technician” (as opposed 
to an “analyst”), the dissent considered Caylor’s presence a “hollow 
formality” and (counter to Melendez-Diaz) stated that Bullcoming 
still had the opportunity under the Compulsory Process Clause to 
call Caylor to the stand.121 Dismissing the majority’s concerns in 
Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz, the dissent considered the scientific 
process to render “impartial lab reports” through the work of “experi-
enced technicians in laboratories that follow professional norms and 
scientific protocols.”122
 Several of the Justices failed to join in the opinion in its entirety, 
arguably falling somewhere in between Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s dissent.123 Notably, Justices So-
tomayor, Kagan, and Thomas refused to join in Part IV of the majori-
ty opinion, leaving only Justices Ginsburg and Scalia to advance the 
notion that the Bullcoming holding will not “impose an undue burden 
on the prosecution” and that the “predictions of dire consequences . . . 
are dubious.”124 Perhaps Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Thomas 
were not willing to agree that retesting the evidence is almost always 
an option or that the burden of initiating the retesting of evidence 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-10876.pdf (stating 
that “I don’t know what the facts are, but boy, it smells bad to me. It really does,” and that 
“the mere possibility” that the prosecution set up the case to avoid Caylor’s cross-
examination “shows why you should have to bring this person in if you want to introduce 
his testimony”). 
 119.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2713 n.5. 
 120.  Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 121.  See id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Melendez-Diaz Court previously 
rejected this argument when it stated that a defendant’s “ability to subpoena” laboratory 
analysts under the Compulsory Process Clause was “no substitute for the right of 
confrontation.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). 
 122.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 123.  See supra note 80. Despite the Bullcoming Court issuing a majority opinion 
with which most Justices agreed, Justices Thomas’s, Kagan’s, and Sotomayor’s refusal to 
join in the entire opinion effectively limits its precedential value. Cf. Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that plurality opinions of the Court where no 
single rationale explains the result should be read to advance the concurring opinion “on 
the narrowest grounds”). 
 124.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2717-18 (stating that only a “small fraction . . . of 
cases” go to trial and estimating that “nearly 95% of convictions in state and federal courts 
are obtained via guilty plea”) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 
2540 (2009)). Justices Ginsburg and Scalia also stated that defendants routinely stipulate 
to admitting scientific evidence and that “analysts testify in only a very small percentage of 
cases,” because defense counsel likely would not want to “highlight” the scientific evidence 
through live testimony. Id. at 2718. 
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would properly fall on the State, and not a defendant, when the test-
ing analyst is unavailable.125 Most troubling, however, is Justice So-
tomayor’s concurring opinion, which painstakingly “emphasize[d] the 
limited reach of the Court’s opinion” and describes several factual 
scenarios that Bullcoming “does not present.”126
 For Justice Sotomayor, the blood sample report was testimonial 
because “its ‘primary purpose’ [was] evidentiary,” particularly consid-
ering the lab report’s formality.127 Perhaps one reason that Justices 
Sotomayor and Thomas consider formality an important component 
of testimonial statements is that informal statements are given less 
weight and credibility than formal ones.128
 Justice Sotomayor’s limitations on the reach of the majority opin-
ion—by illustrating several factual scenarios that the majority opinion 
did not address—almost certainly invites the states to continue to 
reduce Confrontation Clause burdens on the prosecution.129 As such, 
 125.  Id. This argument could be considered inconsistent with the Court’s prior dicta 
regarding states’ “notice-and-demand” statutes. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541 (stating 
that “[s]tates are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections” because “[t]he 
defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection”). 
 126.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice 
Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter caused much speculation as to the future of the 
Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Jonathan Adler, Souter, Sotomayor, &
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2009, 5:55 AM), 
http://volokh.com/posts/1246125087.shtml (speculating that Justice Sotomayor’s prior 
history as a prosecutor and trial court judge “may lead her to take a more pragmatic, and 
less bright-line-oriented approach” and that “her ascension to the Court could have 
dramatic consequences for criminal law, as she could create a new Court majority on these 
issues and roll back recent decisions on the Confrontation Clause, sentencing rules, and 
other areas of criminal law”); Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Is Melendez-Diaz Already 
Endangered?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2009, 1:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2009/06/new-lab-report-case-granted/ (speculating as to why, so soon after deciding 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia,130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010)). 
 127.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas did 
not join Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, but for him, formality is arguably an essential 
aspect of determining the testimonial nature of evidence. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 
2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). This formality requirement may be the very reason the 
Bullcoming majority used the word to describe the blood sample report. See Bullcoming III,
131 S. Ct. at 2717. It may also be why Justice Thomas refused to join in footnote 6. Id. at 
2714 n.6 (stating not that a testimonial statement must be formal, but that it must have 
the “ ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution’ ” (alteration in original) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 822 (2006))). 
 128.  Josephine Ross, What’s Reliability Got to Do With the Confrontation Clause 
After Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 386 n.20 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance 
does not.”). 
 129.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Instead of 
providing clarity on the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence almost 
guarantees the Supreme Court will be asked to review Confrontation Clause appeals 
matching each of the “factual circumstances” she described. The Court has already 
accepted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois, where Illinois used Federal Rule of Evidence 703 
to allow an uninvolved expert witness to rely on underlying testimonial reports (which 
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her concurring opinion provides an excellent analytical vehicle for 
evaluating how these potential future cases may impact the Court’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The remainder of this 
Note will address Justice Sotomayor’s limitations on Bullcoming and 
evaluate Williams v. Illinois,130 the Court’s next significant evolution 
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  
IV.   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S FOUR BULLCOMING LOOPHOLES
A.   The Evidence is Offered for “an Alternate Purpose” 
 Justice Sotomayor first stressed that the Bullcoming prosecutors did 
not suggest that the blood sample report was provided for “an alter-
nate purpose,” suggesting the Court may have reached a different 
result had the blood sample report been conducted for the purposes of 
medical treatment.131 However, the Court has previously indicated in 
recent decisions that statements made for the purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment were not statements made for the “primary 
purpose” of use at trial and, therefore, not testimonial nor subject to 
the Confrontation Clause.132 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence only men-
tions statements for the purposes of medical treatment as an example of 
an “alternate purpose” for the blood sample report, likely because this 
may be the only exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803 that a 
state could logically use to admit a blood sample report into evi-
dence.133 It will be interesting to see if, in the wake of Bullcoming,
prosecutors seek other exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
by asserting the evidence was generated for or served another purpose. 
B.   The Report is Merely a Machine-Generated Printout 
 Justice Sotomayor also stated that the Bullcoming decision did 
not address scenarios where the statements admitted at trial are 
simply printouts of data from laboratory machines.134
                                                                                                                  
were never admitted into evidence) to form the basis of her opinion at trial. Williams v. 
Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081. 
 130.  131 S. Ct. 3090. 
 131.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 132.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011) (listing Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(4) as one of many hearsay exceptions made for a purpose other than 
prosecution); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533 n.2 (stating that “medical reports created 
for treatment purposes” would not be testimonial). 
 133.  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit the states to admit laboratory 
reports as nontestimonial public records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); cf. Melendez-Diaz, 129 
S. Ct. at 2538-40 (discussing why a laboratory report cannot be considered nontestimonial 
as a business record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)). 
 134.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (recognizing the 
State of New Mexico’s argument that the Court did not have to rule on the testimonial 
nature of machine-generated printouts because the State introduced the analyst’s 
certification of the results instead). 
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 Several courts have held that “raw data” printed from a machine 
cannot be testimonial, because the machine is the witness “accusing” 
the defendant.135 This reasoning, however, is nothing more than “an 
attempt to cheat Crawford,”136 as any reliance on it overlooks the fact 
that these scientific tests could not be performed without a human 
element,137 which is susceptible to mistakes.138 Further, a person 
operating the machine must, at some point, record the evidence as 
belonging to a particular suspect; would this declaration of the sam-
ple’s ownership not be, in and of itself, testimonial?139
 Technicians operating crime laboratory equipment must first un-
dergo significant training and carefully follow crucial steps to ensure 
the accuracy of the machine-generated data.140 Even if the analyst is 
aware of the laboratory’s procedures, cross-examination for machine-
generated printouts is essential to ensure the procedures were actually 
followed and that the report was not fraudulently produced to over-
come backlog and the pressures of law enforcement.141 Until the 
Court closes this loophole, prosecutors will likely continue to incorrectly 
admit machine-generated printouts into evidence, alleging they are 
nontestimonial because the printouts are simply “raw data.”  
 135.  United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the 
witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses, and 
that the evidence challenged in this appeal does not contain the statements of human 
witnesses”); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation 
Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by scientific instruments, though the 
interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 
225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the 
‘statements’ of the machines themselves, not their operators.”). 
 136.  Joe Bourne, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When is a Lab 
Report Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1082 (2009). 
 137.  Washington, 498 F.3d at 232-33 (Michael, J., dissenting) (stating that computer-
printed test results “were the hearsay statements of the technicians who ran the tests” and 
that “[t]he test results, although computer-generated, were produced with the assistance 
and input of the technicians and must therefore be attributed to the technicians”). 
 138.  Id. at 235 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Forensic test reports are not always accurate. 
Testing errors are sometimes caused by technician inexperience, sample contamination, 
failure to follow laboratory protocols, or breaks in the chain of custody.”). Conversely, some 
automatic machine printouts, such as transmission information including web site 
addresses or fax numbers, truly may not involve a direct human element. Id. at 233 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (discussing United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 
2005) (involving computer-generated header information from an internet web site) and 
United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving transmission 
information printed on a faxed document)). 
 139.  See Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on Bullcoming, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(June 24, 2009, 8:12 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/06/thoughts-on-
bullcoming.html.  
 140.  Washington, 498 F.3d at 233 (Michael, J., dissenting); see, e.g., supra note 65 and 
accompanying text.  
 141.  See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
552 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:533 
C.   The Substitute Witness is a Supervisor or Test Reviewer 
 Post Melendez-Diaz, many states recognized they had a duty to 
provide defendants with a knowledgeable analyst suitable for cross-
examination.142 For example, the Confrontation Clause would not allow 
the prosecution to substitute the crime lab receptionist for cross-
examination in place of a scientific analyst. Therefore, a testifying ana-
lyst who had not performed the actual tests would be required to meet 
certain standards to pass the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 
 While Bullcoming made clear a surrogate witness who had no 
personal knowledge of the scientific test at issue would not meet the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Sotomayor’s con-
currence stated that Bullcoming does not apply to cases involving a 
“supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, 
connection” to the test.143 But how involved in the testing process 
must the testifying witness have been? 
 Many courts held that the expert witness needed to have been in-
volved in the testing process itself at some level. Both the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that it was not a Confron-
tation Clause violation when the non-test-performing analyst who 
developed conclusions based upon test results testified at trial.144 The 
Florida Supreme Court relied on these cases when it held expert 
testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, so long as the per-
son making the conclusions based on the test results “was present at 
trial and subject to cross-examination with regard to those results.”145
While these courts did require the witness to have had significant in-
volvement with interpreting the test results, none actually required 
the employee who performed the test to face confrontation at trial.146
 142.  See Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 2009) (holding that the 
testimony of a supervisor at the crime lab and a DNA expert witness provided the 
defendant with “two witnesses who were directly involved in the substantive analysis”), 
cert. denied, Pendergrass v. Indiana, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); State v. Dilboy, 999 A.2d 1092, 
1104-05 (N.H. 2010) (holding that testimony from the assistant laboratory director who 
reviewed the test results was sufficient to provide the defendant his Confrontation Clause 
rights), vacated, Dilboy v. New Hampshire, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011) (vacating and remanding 
for further proceedings in light of Bullcoming).
 143.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“We need 
not address what degree of involvement is sufficient because here Razatos had no 
involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.”). 
 144.  United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding it was the 
interpretation of the raw data, not the test results, that may be testimonial); United States 
v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that the test-performing 
employees were technicians, not analysts). 
 145.  Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854-55 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, Smith v. Florida, 
131 S. Ct. 3087 (2011). 
 146.  Moon, 512 F.3d at 362 (stating “the Sixth Amendment does not demand that a 
chemist or other testifying expert have done the lab work himself”); Washington, 498 F.3d 
at 229-30 (stating “there would be no value in cross-examining the lab technicians”); 
Smith, 28 So. 3d at 854-855. 
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 Some courts strayed beyond the expert who analyzed the material 
to allow laboratory supervisors to testify at trial. These courts have 
held that laboratory supervisors could adequately testify to the 
standard procedures used in a laboratory, explain why specific tests 
were performed, and address whether those tests required the use of 
independent judgment and skill.147 Many courts sharing this view 
ruled this way because the supervisors were personally involved in 
the work of their laboratory employees.148
 Supervisors might be a sufficient alternative to the test-
performing analyst because they are responsible for the operations of 
their laboratories. They can be questioned about the procedures they 
established in the lab and how those procedures guarantee accurate 
test results. Supervisors also are charged with monitoring their 
employees’ performances and have more personal knowledge of an 
employee’s analytical skills than a regular colleague would possess. 
Finally, supervisors frequently have more training than their em-
ployees, which gives them the ability to critically review test results 
and recognize deficiencies in performance.   
 However, even a laboratory supervisor might not be able to testify 
whether the laboratory procedures were followed if they did not watch 
their subordinate perform the entire test. Lab tests are quite compli-
cated, taking significant amounts of time and often involving the co-
ordination of several analysts, not just one.149 Given these facts, it 
would be extremely unlikely that laboratory supervisors could monitor 
the procedures of all of their employees closely enough to be able to tes-
tify about the procedures used based on their personal knowledge.150
 147.  Dilboy, 999 A.2d at 1104; see also Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 708 (holding that 
competent testimony from a supervisor prevented the defendant from complaining that he 
lacked adequate opportunity to cross-examine a witness). 
 148.  United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2010) (where the supervisor 
had peer-reviewed the test-performing employee’s work), petition for cert. filed, No. 09-
10231, (Apr. 12, 2010); Washington, 498 F.3d at 229-30 (where the lab’s chief toxicologist 
made conclusions based on test results performed by lab technicians under his 
supervision); Smith, 28 So. 3d at 853 (where the supervisor interpreted the data based on 
test results from biologists on her team); Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 707-08 (where the 
supervisor had personally performed a technical review of the employee’s tests); Dilboy,
999 A.2d at 1097 (where the testifying analyst was the assistant laboratory director of the 
state police forensics toxicology lab). 
 149.  See, e.g., Brief of the States of Indiana, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 9-10, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191) (stating that 
in New York, the crime labs “use an assembly-line-like rotation system for DNA analysis, 
sometimes involving up to 40 analysts per case”). 
 150.  Should a supervisor’s personal knowledge even matter when the analyst who 
certified the test results may not remember the test by the time of trial? See Brief for the 
Respondent in Opposition at 36, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-
591) (stating that the lab technician who performed the test may often fail to “recall from 
actual memory information relating to the specific contents of the writing and would rely 
instead upon the record of his or her own action”) (quoting People v. Johnson, 121 Cal. App. 
4th 1409, 1413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004)). Strictly applying “Crawford may ‘seem 
particularly nonsensical when there is little chance that the actual declarant, the author of 
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D.   The Witness Relied on Testimonial Evidence to Give Her            
Independent Opinion 
 Justice Sotomayor also limited Bullcoming by stating the opinion 
did not address cases in which “expert witness[es] w[ere] asked for 
[their] independent opinion[s] about underlying testimonial reports 
that were not themselves admitted into evidence.”151 Such a scenario 
occurs when the prosecution attempts to avoid Confrontation Clause 
issues by giving a laboratory report to an uninvolved expert witness 
to discuss at trial under the guise of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 
which states: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference . . . need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that 
are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines 
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the ex-
pert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.152
Per Rule 703, the prosecution can even argue testimonial evidence 
should be disclosed at trial, not for the truth of the matter, but in-
stead to allow the jury to better evaluate the expert witness’s opin-
ion.153 Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 705 aids the prosecution by 
making clear that testimonial facts and data could be revealed under 
cross-examination.154 “One of the greatest dangers in allowing other-
wise inadmissible evidence under Rule 705,” however, “is that the 
jury will consider the facts and data as substantive evidence rather 
than as merely constituting the underlying basis for the expert’s 
opinion.”155 Instead of solely serving as an evidence rule for expert 
                                                                                                                  
the forensic report, will still have an independent memory of conducting the test by the 
time of trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation 
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 836 (2007)).  
 151.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 152.  FED. R. EVID. 703 (2010) (emphasis added to reflect new language added during 
the 2000 amendment to Rule 703). The Federal Rules of Evidence were amended in 
December 2011 for stylistic purposes, but the amendments were not intended to change the 
rules substantively. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. The State of Illinois has 
not adopted the 2000 amendment to Rule 703. Brief in Opposition for the Respondent at 10 
n.5, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081. The pre-
2000 Rule 703 is arguably even more prone to misapplication, “result[ing] in the 
destruction of constitutional rights.” Ronald L. Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 A 
Critical Modernization for the New Century?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715, 725, 744 (2000) (arguing 
prior judicial misapplications should end with the adoption of the new amended rule). 
 153.  Brief in Opposition for the Respondent, supra note 152, at 10. 
 154.  FED. R. EVID. 705 (2010) (stating “[t]he expert may in any event be required to 
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination”). The Federal Rules of Evidence 
were amended in December 2011 for stylistic purposes, but the amendments were not 
intended to change the rules substantively. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note. 
 155.  Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Cole v. 
State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Maloney, J., concurring on rehearing)); 
see also Daniel F. Blanchard, III, South Carolina Evidence Rule 703: A Backdoor Exception 
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witnesses, Rule 703 has, in effect, created an additional exception to 
the rules against hearsay.156
 With the risk of the jury considering the scientific evidence for the 
truth of the matter, it is hard to imagine a defendant could effectively 
use cross-examination when it would merely result in the jury hear-
ing additional, unverified, testimonial information from the expert 
witness. As Justice Sotomayor acknowledged, prosecutors using the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to “allow[] an expert witness to discuss 
others’ testimonial statements” would present a different question for 
the Court indeed.157
 For this Bullcoming loophole, however, the Court is not postponing 
ruling on the issue. Five days after deciding Bullcoming, the Court 
granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois.158 Given that the Court only 
needs four Justices’ votes to hear a case,159 it could have been the four 
dissenting Justices from Bullcoming who voted to grant certiorari. 
While any attempts to guess a motive (or the identity of the Justices 
granting certiorari) would be mere speculation, if it was the four dis-
senting Justices, they could be hoping to limit the Confrontation 
Clause’s constitutional requirements to cases where the prosecution 
actually admits a laboratory or scientific report into evidence. 
V. WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS: THE COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE ONE 
OF JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S BULLCOMING LOOPHOLES
 Instead of allowing the Bullcoming dissenters to narrow the pro-
tections of the Confrontation Clause, the Court should use Williams 
v. Illinois160 to shore up its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence regard-
                                                                                                                  
to the Hearsay Rule?, 13 S.C. LAWYER 14, 17 (2002) (stating “if in forming an opinion 
someone assumes that certain facts are true, the acceptance of that opinion necessarily 
involves the acceptance of those assumed facts” (citing Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence 
as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV.
583, 584-85 (1987)); Carlson, supra note 152, at 736 (“The grave risk that jurors will 
misuse the testimony as substantive proof has been widely recognized.”). Once the jury 
hears the testimonial evidence, the horse is arguably out of the barn:  
[J]urors are asked to do the impossible. They are told to consider the hearsay, 
not for its truth, but only as the basis of the expert[’]s opinion. No one truly 
believes jurors (or anyone else for that matter) are capable of making that 
subtle distinction. Instead, jurors consider the hearsay even when the evidence 
is regarded as too unreliable for admission as substantive evidence. 
L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 
1403 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 156.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) 
(No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081 (citing MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF 
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 703.1, at 684 (10th ed. 2010)). 
 157.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 158.  131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).  
 159.  JAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR: A FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
GUIDE 170 (2002) (citing Harris v. Pa. R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 15 (1959)). 
 160.  131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).  
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ing the admission of scientific evidence against a defendant. States 
should not be allowed to evade constitutional protections by keeping 
laboratory reports secret and using Rule 703 to justify the use of 
“surrogate” expert witnesses when, if the reports were entered into 
evidence, Bullcoming would require cross-examination of the ana-
lysts who certified them.161
A.   Williams v. Illinois: The Facts 
 In April 2001, Sandy Williams was arrested for sexual assault, 
aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.162 More than one 
year earlier, in February 2000, a twenty-two-year-old woman identi-
fied as “L.J.” had been attacked while walking home from work after 
8:00 p.m. in Chicago.163 L.J.’s mother contacted the police, who arrived 
at L.J. and her mother’s home shortly after 9:00 p.m.164 L.J. described 
the perpetrator as “a black male, 5 foot, 8 inches tall, wearing a black 
skull cap, a black jacket and driving a beige station wagon.”165
 While L.J. was at the hospital, the police stopped James McChris-
tine, who was driving a beige station wagon near the scene of the at-
tack, and brought him to the hospital.166 An officer testified that L.J. 
“positively identified” McChristine as her attacker that night; at Wil-
liam’s trial, L.J. testified that she told the officer that McChristine 
was not her attacker.167
 The hospital sent the Illinois State Police Crime Lab evidence 
from L.J.’s rape examination, including her blood sample and vaginal 
swabs.168 Semen was detected in the vaginal sample, and the evidence 
was stored in a freezer for nine months until it was sent to Cellmark, 
a laboratory in Illinois for DNA analysis.169 Cellmark returned a 
report providing a DNA profile of the semen from the vaginal swab.170
A DNA “hit” was generated in March 2001 linking Williams to 
 161.  A narrow reading of Melendez-Diaz would have allowed states to evade 
Confrontation Clause requirements by admitting into evidence unsworn laboratory 
certificates or other scientific reports. Moreno, supra note 75, at 331. Similarly, a narrow 
reading of Bullcoming would allow states to evade Confrontation Clause requirements by 
using Rule 703 to have an expert witness base their conclusions on inadmissible 
testimonial evidence. 
 162.  Williams II, 939 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 
28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).  
 163.  Id.
 164. Id.
 165.  Id.
 166.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 156, at 5. 
 167.  Id.; see People v. Williams (Williams I), 895 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 
(June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).  
 168.  Williams II, 939 N.E.2d at 270. 
 169.  Id. at 270-71. 
 170.  Id. at 271. 
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L.J.’s attack, after which L.J. identified Williams as her attacker in 
a lineup.171
 At trial, forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos stated that she 
matched Cellmark’s reported DNA profile to Williams, whose DNA 
was in the Illinois DNA database from an unrelated arrest.172 She did 
not personally analyze the semen sample sent to Cellmark, instead 
relying on the DNA profile within the resulting report.173 Cellmark’s 
report reflected that the semen sample contained “a mixture of DNA 
profiles,” and Lambatos “opined” that Cellmark likely extracted L.J.’s 
DNA profile from the mixture to deduce the resulting male’s DNA 
profile.174 Still, Cellmark’s resulting report reflected “unaccounted 
genetic material,” which Lambatos described as “white noise.”175
Lambatos admitted it was possible Cellmark had a degraded evi-
dence sample, though she did not observe any signs of degradation 
from Cellmark’s report.176
 While Lambatos testified that Cellmark was an accredited labora-
tory and that they “generally performed proficiency tests” that she 
developed, she admitted that she did not observe the tests the 
Cellmark analysts performed and that Cellmark had “different pro-
cedures and standards” than the ones followed at the Illinois State 
Crime Lab.177 No one from Cellmark testified at William’s trial about 
Cellmark’s procedures, how the DNA test was performed, or the 
education and training of the analysts who performed the test.178
Williams was sentenced to two concurrent natural life terms, a con-
secutive 60-year term, and another concurrent term of 15 years.179
 Relying on Rule 703, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected Wil-
liams’s argument that Lambatos could not provide a proper foundation 
for Cellmark’s test results, which were not entered into evidence.180
The court also rejected Williams’s Confrontation Clause arguments, 
stating that under Crawford, the prosecution was permitted to 
disclose testimonial information at trial to “provide a basis for Lam-
batos’[s] opinion,” and that Cellmark’s DNA profile report was not 
discussed to prove the truth of the matter.181
 On appeal in 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it was not 
bound by Melendez-Diaz, simply because the prosecution did not offer 
 171.  Williams I, 895 N.E. 2d at 964. 
 172.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 156, at 6. 
 173.  Williams I, 895 N.E. 2d at 965. 
 174.  Id.
 175.  Id.
 176.  Id.
 177.  Id.
 178.  See id. at 966. 
 179.  Id. at 963. 
 180.  Id. at 966-67. 
 181.  Id. at 969-70 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). 
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Cellmark’s report into evidence.182 As such, the court held that a 
Confrontation Clause violation would only occur if the Cellmark re-
port was hearsay introduced to prove the truth of the matter.183
Instead of finding that the Cellmark report was admitted to prove 
Cellmark’s assertions, however, the court found “[t]he evidence 
against the defendant was Lambatos’[s] opinion, not Cellmark’s 
report.”184 Because Lambatos did not read from Cellmark’s report and 
it was part of the data she looked at to form her opinion, it was dis-
cussed to show the trial court the basis of her opinion, not to prove 
the truth as to its contents.185
B.   Analyzing Williams v. Illinois
 While expert witnesses can use inadmissible evidence as the basis 
for their opinion at trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence cannot trump 
the Sixth Amendment’s constitutionally guaranteed rights.186 The 
Supreme Court should not allow states to evade Confrontation 
Clause requirements solely because a Federal Rule of Evidence, in 
and of itself, would permit the testimony. Importantly, Rule 703 
“does not purport to state a constitutional principle. Nor does it state 
an evidentiary principle of long standing; it was developed and 
adopted in the third quarter of the 20th century.”187 As such, Rule 
703 appears to work best in civil cases and with nontestimonial evi-
dence, neither of which implicate the Confrontation Clause. But, 
when Rule 703 does come into conflict with the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause, it is unfathomable anyone would suggest the 
nearly 240-year-old Constitution should give way for an evidentiary 
rule enacted less than fifty years ago. 
 Like the Illinois State Supreme Court in People v. Williams, many 
courts have permitted expert witnesses in criminal trials to use sci-
entific evidence as the basis of their opinion, finding that so long as 
the witness does not disclose the underlying testimonial evidence for 
the truth of the matter asserted, the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights have not been violated.188 Experts may not simply 
 182.  See Williams II, 939 N.E.2d 268, 282 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 
(June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081; Brief in Opposition for the Respondent, 
supra note 152, at 9.  
 183.  Williams II, 939 N.E.2d at 277.  
 184.  Id. at 279 (stating “there is room for subjective judgment” in the DNA analysis). 
 185.  Id. at 282. 
 186.  FED. R. EVID. 703 (2010); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (holding “we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules 
of evidence”). 
 187.  Richard D. Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(July 9, 2011, 2:26 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-on-
williams.html.  
 188.  United States v. Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding the 
expert witness could not disclose the underlying testimonial hearsay on which he based his 
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adopt the opinion of the original analyst or testimonial report; rather, 
they can only testify to conclusions reached through their own inde-
pendent judgment.189 If a substitute analyst will not be “relying upon 
her own expertise in arriving at her conclusions, . . . the integrity of 
the judicial system” would be better served by rescheduling the trial 
so the test-performing analyst can testify.190
 The real danger with allowing an uninvolved expert witness to 
testify, without also requiring the testimony of the analyst responsible 
for the testimonial material, is that the expert may base her deci-
sions on erroneous or corrupt work product. Logically, the expert’s 
opinion is only as solid as the underlying evidence upon which she 
relied. The test-performing scientist’s veracity, capability, and accu-
racy simply cannot be evaluated in court through a surrogate witness.  
 As is true with any witness providing hearsay testimony, the trial 
judge or jury cannot directly uncover the truth of the matter asserted 
because the witness is testifying to something she did not personally 
experience. The person who does not witness the scientific tests can-
not testify at trial with 100% accuracy to the truth of the evidence 
upon which she relied. An analyst who was not present when the 
tests were performed cannot testify whether the lab’s procedures 
were followed or whether the tests were completely fabricated. 
 Even if the test-performing analyst is an honest, hard-working 
scientist, it does not necessarily follow that she was competent and 
did not make a mistake along the way. Like any other expert witness, 
forcing laboratory scientists to face cross-examination gives the 
defendant an opportunity to expose a “lack of proper training or defi-
ciency in judgment.”191
 Despite this reasoning, the Court could instead affirm the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Illinois. Perhaps one of the big-
                                                                                                                  
opinion); United States v. Mirabal, No. CR 09-3207 JB, 2010 WL 3834072, at *4 (D.N.M. 
Aug. 7, 2010) (holding that the testifying expert’s conclusions “must be her own, and not a 
parroting of” the other analyst’s); United States v. Alexander, Nos. 2:04-cr-71, 2:09-cv-294, 
2010 WL 404072, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2010) (holding the Confrontation Clause was not 
violated where the expert testified to his own independent analysis); Commonwealth v. 
Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that the expert could not testify about 
the testimonial findings within an autopsy report); Marshall v. State, 232 P.3d 467, 475 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that the expert witness’s testimony “must be confined to 
his or her own opinions and the expert must be available for cross-examination”); Wood v. 
State, 299 S.W. 3d 200, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that disclosing testimonial 
statements from an autopsy report, even though the witness also testified to his own 
independent opinion, was a Confrontation Clause violation). 
 189.  Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 9. The Fourth Circuit has also held that an expert 
witness may not testify to the conclusions of another analyst absent from trial in an effort 
to bolster his or her own opinion. United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143 
(4th Cir. 1994) (prohibiting an expert witness from testifying that his and a more 
prominent doctor’s conclusions were “essentially the same”). 
 190.  Mirabal, 2010 WL 3834072, at *6. 
 191.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009). 
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gest issues the case will turn upon is the Justices’ opinion of the 
“formality” of the Cellmark report. While Bullcoming made clear a 
scientific report does not achieve formality because it is sworn, Justice 
Thomas and even Justice Sotomayor may find that it is the report’s 
actual admission into evidence that gives the report the requisite 
formality to be considered testimonial. Justice Thomas may find that 
a scientific report used by an expert witness at trial but not admitted 
into evidence does not implicate the types of confrontation issues with 
which the Framers were historically concerned.192 Historically, the 
Framers might not have been concerned with more informal, casual 
comments being submitted at trial in place of live testimony.193
 However, whether or not laboratory reports are admitted into evi-
dence should not be the controlling factor in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. Accusations at trial, particularly ones involving scien-
tific evidence, appear much more formal than casual commentary 
made to a friend.194 Further, when expert witnesses are significantly 
relying on the result of one scientific test to form the basis of their 
opinions, the expert witnesses become more “summary witness[es]” 
than experts in their own right.195
 While it is true that it is Lambatos’s expert opinion that is at is-
sue, so too is the authenticity and accuracy of the evidence upon 
which she based her opinion. Williams should have had not only the 
opportunity through cross-examination to test the credibility and re-
liability of the expert but also the authenticity and reliability of the 
scientific evidence upon which she based her opinion. Williams could 
not have had this opportunity without the ability to cross-examine 
the Cellmark analyst who certified the test results. 
 Such a rule would not unduly burden prosecutors and law en-
forcement. Twice now the Supreme Court has approved of states’ use 
of notice and demand statutes, which provide a limited window with-
in which a defendant may invoke—or else waive—her Confrontation 
Clause right after receiving notice of the government’s intent to use 
scientific evidence at trial.196 In fact, “there is no evidence that the 
criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one 
way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s ap-
 192.  Ross, supra note 128, at 386 (stating that “Justice Thomas believes that the Court 
should determine which abuses threatened confrontation rights at the time of the 
Founders, and freeze the application of the Clause to cover only those abuses”). 
 193.  Id. at 385-86. 
 194.  Id. at 386 (stating “jurors often believe statements made to doctors”); see also 
supra note 69 about the “CSI Effect.” 
 195.  See United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that a 
witness needs to rely on multiple sources of evidence and use them to form his own opinion, 
not simply summarize the content of an extrajudicial statement).  
 196.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. 
2012]  “BULL” COMING FROM THE STATES 561 
pearance at trial.”197 With few cases actually going to trial, and de-
fendants frequently stipulating the admission of forensic evidence in 
the cases that do,198 prosecutors have the ability to manage the Con-
frontation Clause’s constitutional requirements. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
  States cannot ignore the obligations of the Confrontation Clause 
simply because the Clause might make “the prosecution of criminals 
more burdensome.”199 Indeed, the Court has shown its willingness to 
enforce constitutional guarantees, even though these protections may 
result in additional costs for taxpayers.200 Through its Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence in Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming,
the Court has already established that a surrogate witness cannot 
testify to laboratory reports certified by other scientists not appear-
ing at trial. By reversing the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in 
People v. Williams, the Court would affirm the importance of pre-
venting the admission of accusatory hearsay evidence without cross-
examination in criminal trials. Prosecutors should not be able to 
dodge the Confrontation Clause’s requirements simply by keeping a 
testimonial report, upon which the testifying substitute witness ba-
ses their decision, out of evidence.201
 Following Bullcoming, only one proposition in Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence is certain: We have not heard the Court’s last 
word on the Sixth Amendment’s requirements for the admission of 
scientific evidence in criminal trials. 
 197.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. 
 198.  Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct at 2718 (Ginsberg & Scalia, JJ.). 
 199.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (stating the right of confrontation is “binding” 
and comparing it to the right of trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination). 
 200.  See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591) (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 
(1963) as an example). 
 201.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (holding that “we do not think 
it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by 
having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony”). 
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